AHOMF Thesis
A propaganda call is not noise: it is an operational instrument. The January 2024 speech illustrates how a territorially defeated organisation can still project strategic effects — by inspiring autonomous actors, exploiting grievances and geopolitical flashpoints, and concentrating violence where counter-terrorism capacity is weakest. Countering it requires more than military pressure: governance, socio-economic development, digital monitoring and international coordination.
Propaganda and Manipulation
The organisation as self-appointed preceptor
Daech seized the opportunity of the Israeli military response in Gaza to pose as guardian of Islam and of the Arab cause — while advancing a four-axis narrative synthesised by Aymenn J. Al-Tamimi.
The Four Axes
1. Solidarity with the Muslims of Gaza.
2. The sacred character of Palestinian land.
3. Criticism of Iran and of Arab states cooperating with Israel.
4. The call to exterminate Jews — explicitly rejecting any distinction between civilians and soldiers.
The doctrinal formula — “monotheism is the goal, and jihad is the path” — discredits every competing form of governance, including democracy and secularism.
Hegemonic Claims
Daech presents the caliphate as retaining operational momentum despite its losses, supports Palestinian factions joining “authentic jihad” free of Iranian influence, and attacks the Hezbollah and Iran-backed groups in Yemen and Iraq while inciting Sunni populations against Iran.
Governments cooperating with Israel — Jordan, Egypt — are branded as traitors, and their populations urged to rebel. The call extends beyond doctrine: cells, militants and supporters are urged to target “Jews, Christians and their criminal allies” worldwide — an operation of unlimited and imprecise contours.
Targets and Tactics
Civilians first, lone wolves as the vector
Priority is given to civilians — easier to reach than military forces. Geography is global: Israel, America and Europe first, with insidious extension to Africa, India and the Caucasus.
Target Set
Individuals alone or in groups, shopping centres, transport, leisure and places of worship — synagogues, churches, symbols — in the streets and on the roads “of America, Europe and the world”. The speech explicitly instructs: attack their homes, kill and torture by every possible means.
Modus Operandi
Mostly “lone-wolf” attacks — individuals indoctrinated with Daech ideology and methods who can act on their own initiative without belonging to a structure — through suicide bombings, incendiary devices, shootings, bladed weapons and vehicles, diversifying modes of action.
Campaign Lineage
A known pattern: terrifying calls after significant reverses
Breaking the Walls · 2012
During the organisation’s emergence in Iraq: mass prison breaks designed to replenish its ranks and project momentum.
Battles of Attrition · 2019–2020
Declared after territorial losses of the caliphate and the return to traditional insurgency.
Revenge of the Two Sheikhs · 2022
Proclaimed after Western strikes killed calife Abu Ibrahim al-Quraishi and spokesman Abu Hamza al-Quraishi.
Each of these calls has produced significant effects on the ground, re-galvanising units, members and sympathisers. The January 2024 call is the fourth movement of this cycle.
Operational Effects
From the call to the attacks: days, not months
TRAC — 4 to 12 January 2024
about 100 attacks claimed worldwide under this banner in nine days — the majority in sub-Saharan Africa, where counter-terrorism devices are less effective than in America or Europe.
Sarkin Aiki, Nigeria · 19 Jan
Armed bandits attacked the local police with numerous casualties and heavy material damage — an incident later claimed by Daech, outside its usual sphere, hinting at indirect action through other armed groups.
Istanbul · 28 Jan
Armed attack against the Italian Catholic church of Santa Maria during a religious service: one death, claimed by Daech.
Edmonton, Canada · 28 Jan
A heavily armed lone wolf opened fire and threw Molotov cocktails inside city hall after publishing a video manifesto.
Resurgence and Influence Zones
A decentralised metastasis
The terrorist threat has been reconfigured around Daech’s operational resurgence, a decentralised network of affiliates, African expansion and a heightened risk of isolated attacks.
The Numbers — IEP 2025
In 2024, 559 attacks by Daech and its affiliates killed 1,805 people in 22 countries across the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Europe — 34 more attacks (+6%) than in 2023. In 2025 the group still topped the ranking of the most violent terrorist organisations worldwide, despite its significant retreat in Iraq and Syria.
Structure — 9 Branches
A decentralised network operating in 23 countries in Africa and the Levant, concentrated in Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo — a threshold not reached since 2020, when the group struck in 30 countries. The tribune states 9 affiliated branches and names eight: ISK (Khorasan), ISIL (Iraq & Levant), ISS (Sahel), ISWA (West Africa), Sinai, Libya, ISM (Mozambique), Central Africa. Each branch operates semi-autonomously, linked to the centre by a bay’a oath of allegiance.
Exploitation Channels
Daech’s central extremist ideology keeps resonating with aspiring extremists through social networks, online forums and a sophisticated propaganda apparatus aimed at vulnerable and marginalised populations. The group retains the ability to exploit historical grievances and implant franchises in regions marked by political corruption, deep socio-economic inequalities and weak governance.
AHOMF Commentary — Strategic Implications
What the Rhetoric Reveals
1. Strategic durability of the call: although emanating from an organisation weakened at the centre, the January 2024 appeal has produced lasting strategic impact — between 2024 and 2025 Daech became a decentralised global threat.
2. Africa as centre of gravity: the concentration of claimed attacks in sub-Saharan Africa confirms where counter-terrorism capacity is least dense and franchise implantation easiest.
3. The lone-wolf multiplier: autonomous actors require no logistics chain, making prevention harder than interdiction — digital monitoring and early social detection become decisive.
4. Beyond the military response: the fight requires targeted military efforts and prevention initiatives — stronger governance in the Global South, socio-economic development, digital surveillance and increased international coordination, particularly in regions with low security capacity.
Publication Details
Author: Andre Hubert Onana Mfege, PhD in Military History and National Defence Studies — associated researcher and lecturer in defence, security and international relations.
Tribune: No. 1875, published 22 October 2026 — Defence Nationale, « Tuez-les où que vous les trouviez » : les implications stratégiques d’une rhétorique djihadiste.
Source: www.defnat.com — PDF, 5 pages (FR).